One of the most inºuential scientiªc treatises in Cauchy's era was J.-L. Lagrange's Mécanique Analytique, the second edition of which came out in 1811, when Cauchy was barely out of his teens. Lagrange opens his treatise with an unequivocal endorsement of inªnitesimals. Referring to the system of inªnitesimal calculus, Lagrange writes:
Lorsqu'on a bien conçu l'esprit de ce système, et qu'on s'est convaincu de l'exactitude de ses résultats par la méthode géométrique des premières et dernières raisons, ou par la méthode analytique des fonctions dérivées, on peut employer les inªniment petits comme un instrument sûr et commode pour abréger et simpliªer les demonstrations. ([1811] 2009, p. iv) 1 Lagrange's renewed enthusiasm for inªnitesimals in 1811 went hand-inhand with a reliance both on his method of power series, and on the principle of the "generality of algebra" which proved to be extremely fruitful throughout the 18th century. However, Cauchy was already becoming aware of the limitations of these techniques. He was aware of examples such as e x −1 2 / where the Taylor series at the origin does not reproduce the function; the use of divergent power series was recognized as leading to errors; the limitations of the "generality of algebra" were beginning to be felt, particularly in the study of Fourier series. The tension resided in the challenge posed by Lagrange's treatise: can Cauchy sift the chaff from the grain? By 1823, Cauchy was ready to go on the offensive, explicitly naming the Mécanique analytique as the target of his criticisms. Cauchy's great accomplishment was his recognition that, while Lagrange's ºawed power series method and his principle of the generality of algebra do not measure up to the standard of rigor Cauchy sought to uphold in his own work, the inªnitesimals can indeed be reconciled with such a standard of rigor. The resolution of the tension between the rejection of Lagrange's conceptual framework, on the one hand, and the acceptance of his inªnitesimals, on the other, is expressed by Cauchy in the following terms:
My main aim has been to reconcile the rigor, which I have made a law in my Cours d'Analyse, with the simplicity that comes from the direct consideration of inªnitely small quantities. (Cauchy [1823] 1899, p. 10) Cauchy reconciled his rejection of Lagrange's ºawed conceptual framework, on the one hand, with his acceptance of Lagrange's inªnitesimals, on the other. 2 The Cours d'Analyse is Cauchy's 1821 textbook where his inªnitesimal deªnition of continuity ªrst appeared, as discussed in the next section.
Cauchy's Continuity
In 1853, at the dusk of his scientiªc carrier, Cauchy reafªrmed the deªnition of continuity he had given 32 years earlier, in his inºuential textbook Cours d'Analyse, in the following terms:
and has convinced oneself of the correctness of its results by means of the geometric method of the prime and ultimate ratios, or by means of the analytic method of derivatives, one can then exploit the inªnitely small as a reliable and convenient tool so as to shorten and simplify proofs."
In accordance with the deªnition proposed in my Analyse Algébrique, and generally accepted today, a function u of a real variable x will be continuous between two given bounds of x, if [. . .] an inªnitely small increment of the variable always produces, between the given bounds, an inªnitely small increment of the function itself. ([1853] 1900, p. 32) Meanwhile, inªnitesimals themselves are deªned in terms of variable quantities becoming arbitrarily small (which have often been interpreted as null sequences). Cauchy writes that such a null sequence "becomes" an inªnitesimal ␣. Cauchy's terminology was analyzed by Sad et al (2001) . It is interesting to note that Cauchy suppresses the index of the n-th term in such a sequence, and emphasizes the competing index of the order, n, of the inªnitesimal ␣ n ; this will be dealt with in more detail in Borovik and Katz (2011) .
We will return to Cauchy's 1853 article below. In a recent article attempting a synthesis of Lakoff and Lakatos, T. Koetsier writes:
In the following reconstruction I will interpret some of Cauchy's results in accordance with the traditional view of his work. A [. . .] presentation of this view is in [J.] Grabiner (1981) . (2009, footnote 13) What is the traditional view, in accordance with which Koetsier seeks to interpret some of Cauchy's results? Brieºy, while Cauchy's deªnition of continuity is ostensibly formulated in the language of inªnitely small quantities, the traditional interpretation seeks to subsume Cauchy's inªnitesimals under a notion of limit. 3 The proclivity to interpreting inªnitesimals as limits is hardly limited to Cauchy's work. J. Havenel (2008) describes the reaction to such an interpretation, on the part of the American philosopher C. S. Peirce.
Havenel notes that
Peirce was fully aware that in his time, the notion of inªnitesimal was strongly rejected by most mathematicians, especially in analysis, with the works of Weierstrass, Dedekind, and Cantor. (p. 101) Peirce wrote that the doctrine of limits has been invented to evade the difªculty, or according to some as an exposition of the signiªcance of[,] the word inªnitesimal. [1976, 3:122] Thus, the traditional interpretation institutes a kind of an automated inªnitesimal-to-limits translation. Such an interpretation, as applied to Cauchy's work, is actually considerably older than Grabiner's book referred to by Koetsier. Boyer (1949) had already declared that Cauchy's inªnitesimals "are to be understood in terms of limits." 4 Meanwhile, the Cauchy scholar P. Jourdain in his seminal 1913 work makes no attempt to reduce Cauchy's inªnitesimals to limits.
Nearly a century after Jourdain, the limit interpretation has become so entrenched as to be taken as the literal meaning of Cauchy's deªnitions by a number of historians. Thus, J. Gray lists continuity among concepts Cauchy allegedly deªned using careful, if not altogether unambiguous, limiting arguments. (2008, p. 62) Similarly, in his 2007 anthology, S. Hawking reproduces Cauchy's inªnitesimal deªnition of continuity on page 639-but claims on the same page, in a comic non-sequitur, that Cauchy "was particularly concerned to banish inªnitesimals."
The subject of Cauchy's continuity (and particularly the related sum theorem) was recently taken up by K. Bråting (2007) . We will build on her work, not so much to restore Cauchy's inªnitesimals to their rightful place in Cauchy's inªnitesimal-enriched continuum, as to argue that the traditional interpretation in terms of limits in the context of a standard Archimedean continuum, is self-contradictory, and in particular untenable.
Bråting's Close Reading
The precise relation between Cauchy's variable quantities, on the one hand, and his inªnitesimals, on the other, has been the subject of an ongoing debate. In K. Bråting's text (2007) , the two sides of the debate are represented by E. Giusti (1984) and D. Laugwitz (1987) . Their respective positions can be traced to a pair of rival interpretations of the continuum found in the work of E. Björling, a contemporary of Cauchy.
In a footnote to his 1846 paper, Björling for the ªrst time introduces his distinction between the following two clauses: (A) "for every given value of x"; (B) "for all values of x".
Here clause (A) refers to what we would describe today as the "thin" real Archimedean continuum, or A-continuum. Meanwhile, clause (B) describes the broader class, including elements described by Björling as variable quantities, more concretely sequences depending on n, corresponding to an enriched Leibnizian continuum. Johann Bernoulli was the ªrst to use inªnitesimals systematically as a foundational concept. Therefore we will refer to such a "thick" continuum as a Bernoullian continuum, or B-continuum. 5 A more detailed discussion of the rival continua may be found in Appendices B and C.
Terminology similar to Björling's was exploited by S. D. Poisson. Poisson describes inªnitesimals as being "less than any given magnitude of the same nature." 6 The distinction between given, i.e. constant, as opposed to variable, i.e., changing, is close to Björling's dichotomy.
Bråting was hardly the ªrst to analyze the fundamental difference between the two continua. Having outlined the developments in real analysis associated with Weierstrass and his followers, Felix Klein pointed out in 1908 that
The scientiªc mathematics of today is built upon the series of developments which we have been outlining. But an essentially different conception of inªnitesimal calculus has been running parallel with this [conception] through the centuries. ([1908] 1932, p. 214 ; emphasis added) Thus we have two parallel tracks for conceptualizing inªnitesimal calculus:
5. An inªnitesimal-enriched B-continuum is not a unique mathematical structure. Thus, the intuitionistic Nieuwentijdt-Lawvere continuum is a markedly different implementation of an inªnitesimal-enriched continuum as compared to Robinson's, as it contains nilsquare inªnitesimals, see J. Bell (2009) and Appendix C below. See Feferman (2009) for an analysis of the continuum in terms of predicativism and conceptual structuralism.
6. Quote from Poisson (1833, pp. 13-14) reproduced in Boyer (1949, p. 283) . Note that P. Ehrlich inexplicably omits the crucial modiªer "given" when quoting Poisson (see Ehrlich 2006, p. 76, n. 133) . Based on the incomplete quote, Ehrlich proceeds to agree with Veronese's assessment (of Poisson) that "[t]his proposition evidently contains a contradiction in terms" (Veronese 1891, p. 622) . Our assessment is that Poisson's deªnition of inªnitesimals is consistent if understood in terms of Björling's dichotomy.
(This theme is pursued further in Appendix B.) Klein further points out that such a parallel conception of calculus harks back to old metaphysical speculations concerning the structure of the continuum according to which this was made up of [. . .] inªnitely small parts. (p. 214)
The rival theories of the continuum evoked by Klein are the subject of Björling's deliberations here, as well.
In his 1853 text, Björling exploits this distinction to argue against a purported counterexample, published by F. Arndt in 1852, to Cauchy's 1821 "sum theorem." 7 Namely, Björling points out that in fact Arndt's counterexample only converges "for every given value," i.e., value from the narrow A-continuum. Meanwhile, it does not converge "for all values," i.e., values from the enriched B-continuum. Björling concludes that Cauchy's 1853 hypothesis in fact bars Arndt's example. 8 The mutual interactions and inºuences between Cauchy and Björling were explored by Grattan-Guinness (1987) , who argues that Cauchy read Björling's text, and was inºuenced by it to modify/clarify the hypothesis of the 1821 sum theorem. Namely, in 1853 Cauchy added the word "always" to indicate that the hypothesis is interpreted to apply for all x (B-continuum) rather then merely for every given x (A-continuum).
Whether Cauchy's addition, in 1853, of the word "always" is a modiªcation or a clariªcation of the 1821 condition, is subject to dispute, and is not a major concern here. A narrow A-continuum interpretation of the 1821 hypothesis (which would then falsify the "sum theorem" as stated in 1821) is consistent with Grattan-Guinness's view that Cauchy was inºuenced by Björling in 1853 to broaden the interpretation to a B-continuum. Laugwitz (1987, p. 265 ) quotes Cauchy ([1853 Cauchy ([ ] 1900 as admitting that the statement of the 1821 theorem (but not its proof) was incorrect: "Au reste, il est facile de voir comment on doit modiªer l'énoncé du théorème, pour qu'il n'y plus lieu à aucune exception." Note that only a single independent variable, x, occurs in Cauchy's hypothesis, whether in 1821 or in 1853. As traditionally stated, uniform convergence is a global condition stated in terms of a pair of independent variables. Interpreting Cauchy's addition of the word always as "strengthening the hypothesis to 7. Bråting (2007, p. 521 ) translates Cauchy's sum theorem as follows: "When the different terms of the series [u 0 ϩ u 1 ϩ u 2 ϩ ... ϩ u n ϩ ...] are functions of the same variable x, continuous with respect to that variable in the vicinity of a particular value for which the series is convergent, the sum s of the series is also a continuous function of x in the vicinity of this particular value." The reference is in Cauchy (1821, pp. 131-132) .
8. Bråting does not comment on how the hypothesis of Cauchy's 1821 sum theorem may have been viewed by Björling. uniform continuity," a claim commonly found in the literature, is therefore a feedback-style extrapolation (see also Section 5).
The crucial point is presented by Bråting in formula (2.4) on page 522 and the line following. (A similar point was made by Laugwitz in 1989 (p. 212) , in terms of the equality ϭ v.) Bråting documents Cauchy's use of the same index n, both as a subscript of a partial sum s n of the series s u i = ⌺ , and the value x n = 1 at which the partial sum is evaluated. Namely, the index n appears in Bråting's formula (2.4) as the index in an expression spelling out the difference Ϫ s n , and it also appears on the next line, in the expression x n = 1 . In other words, Cauchy does not limit the dynamic variable/sequential approach to his "quantities." 9 A more detailed discussion of Cauchy's text may be found in Section 4.
What does emerge from Bråting's analysis is that the competing interpretations by Giusti (1984) and by Laugwitz (1987) both have legitimate sources in mid-19th century work of a Swedish mathematician who was in close contact with Cauchy (see Bråting 2007, p. 521) .
Like L. Carnot before him, Cauchy represented inªnitesimals by null sequences. Cauchy spoke of variables or sequences, say ͗u n : n ∈ N͘, as becoming inªnitesimals. The precise meaning of Cauchy's use of the verb "become" is subject to dispute. Meanwhile, a key question is whether, after becoming an inªnitesimal, such an entity ͗u n ͘ is admitted to his continuum.
We see that, in 1853, Cauchy used the expression x n = 1 to show that counterexamples such as Abel's 1826 "exception" did not satisfy Cauchy's hypothesis. This reveals that he is willing to evaluate a function at a variable quantity, used as input to the function. The fact that Cauchy exploits such a quantity as an input to his functions, suggests that quantities in the wider sense of a B-continuum were indeed part of Cauchy's continuum, at least at this later time. If this interpretation is admitted, then testing an analytical hypothesis at all members of the continuum would naturally include testing at x n = 1 , as well. If on the other hand ͗u n ͘ is not admitted as a member of the continuum, then the continuum is restricted to what Björling called ªxed values (namely, belonging to an A-continuum). 9. Cauchy's 1853 text shows that Cauchy applies such an approach to functions, as well. A dynamic function, such as the sequence ͗s n (x):n ∈ N͘ of partial sums, is applied by Cauchy to the quantity 1 n by evaluating term-by-term, to obtain a new dynamic quantity ͗s n ( ) 1 n :n ∈ N͘, generating another member of Cauchy's continuum. While, clearly, modern constructions and concepts such as the ultrapower construction, internal set, etc. have no place in Cauchy's world, a reader already familiar with the latter concepts may ªnd it helpful, in understanding Cauchy, to note the parallel situation when an internal function [s n ] is applied to a hyperreal [u n ] in a term-by-term fashion. See also Section 4.
Cauchy's 1853 Text
Cauchy's text Note sur les séries convergentes dont les divers termes sont des fonctions continues d'une variable réelle ou imaginaire, entre des limites données appeared in 1853. On page 32, Cauchy recalls the deªnition of continuity already mentioned in Section 2. Cauchy deals with a series s u
and remainder r n ϭ s Ϫ s n . He now considers ′ n Ͼ n and the expression s n′ Ϫ s n ϭ u n ϩ ... ϩ u n′−1 , and proceeds to state his Theorem 1 to the effect that if u n are continuous in x, and s n′ Ϫ s n devient toujours (always becomes) inªnitely small, then the sum s will be a continuous function of the variable x ([1853] 1900, p. 33) .
To illustrate why the series ⌺ i ix i sin is not a counterexample, he undertakes a remarkable maneuver that has sparked controversy ever since, namely he evaluates s n′ Ϫ s n at x n = 1 , with the same n appearing in the denominator of x and as a subscript in s n . Cauchy concludes that the remainder does not become small, by comparing it to an integral (p. 34). He then proceeds to state a complex version of the same result, again insisting on the "devient toujours" clause (p. 35).
It is interesting to note that in the ensuing discussion, Cauchy evokes the property of the continuity of a function in the following terms: D'après ce qu'on vient de dire, une fonction monodrome de z variera par degrés insensibles, etc. ([1853] 1900, p. 35) The expression par degrés insensibles [by imperceptible degrees] appears to be a reformulation of his inªnitesimal deªnition as stated by Cauchy on page 32. The same expression was used by Cauchy in his letter to Coriolis in 1837.
Is the Traditional Reading Coherent?
We will build on Bråting's analysis to examine a traditional reading of Cauchy's deªnitions. Cutland et al (1988, p. 376) note that [Cauchy's] modiªcation of his theorem is anything but clear if we interpret his conception of the continuum as identical with the 'Weierstrassian' concept.
We will elaborate on this comment, based on an interpretation of Cauchy given by C. Boyer. 10 Boyer quotes Cauchy's deªnition of continuity as follows: "the function f is continuous within given limits if between these limits an inªnitely small increment i in the variable x produces always an inªnitely small increment, f(x ϩ i) Ϫ f(x), in the function itself" (Boyer 1949, p. 277 ). Next, Boyer proceeds to interpret Cauchy's deªnition of continuity as follows:
The expressions inªnitely small are here to be understood [. . .] in terms of [. . .] limits: i.e., f(x) is continuous within an interval if the limit of the variable f(x) as x approaches a is f(a), for any value of a within this interval. (p. 277)
Boyer feels that inªnitesimals are to be understood in terms of limits. Or perhaps they are to be understood otherwise?
Given the frequent references to Jourdain (1913) in Boyer's text, it is worth mentioning a striking aspect of the discussion of the notion of continuity in Jourdain: there is a total absence of any claim to the effect that Cauchy based his notion of continuity, on limits.
As we consider Boyer's interpretation in detail, we ªnd that there are two problems:
(1) historians generally agree that Cauchy did not have the notion of continuity at a point. Boyer's introduction of the value a, and quantiªcation over a, is not present in Cauchy.
(2) consider the function f(x) ϭ sin 1
x explicitly mentioned the 1821 textbook Cours d'Analyse by Cauchy. How would Cauchy view f, given his deªnition of continuity? From Boyer's post-Weierstrassian viewpoint, the function f is continuous wherever it is deªned. However, this is not necessarily Cauchy's view. In Cauchy's "geometrical intuitions [. . .] led him erroneously to believe that the continuity of a function was sufªcient [. . .] for the existence of a derivative." Boyer continues: "A. M. Ampère also had been led by geometric preconceptions similar to those of Cauchy to try to demonstrate the false proposition that every continuous function has a derivative, except for certain isolated values in the interval." Boyer provides a footnote (his footnote 45) containing a reference to Jourdain (1913) , but Jourdain's text does not bear out Boyer's claim, on the contrary. Jourdain makes it clear that Ampère is the one who "proved" that every continuous function has a derivative. Jourdain (1913, p. 702 ) discusses Ampère's error in detail. Boyer appears to have mixed up Cauchy and Ampère. Cauchy's treatises on differential analysis show clearly that he was aware of the fact that possible points of nondifferentiability need to be taken into account in formulating the fundamental theorem of calculus (each point of the ªrst kind contributes a boundary term to the formula), and felt, as many did in his era, that there should be only ªnitely many such points. Section 3, we followed Bråting in analyzing Cauchy's test of his condition with regard to the input x generated by the sequence 1 n Now choose the inªnitesimal i generated by the same sequence. The difference
does not tend to zero. If so, would f pass Cauchy's test for continuity?
The basic problem with standard Cauchy historiography, as exempliªed by Boyer's interpretation of Cauchy's inªnitesimals, seems to be as follows. Many historians have claimed that Cauchy modiªed the hypothesis of his sum theorem in 1853, by introducing the stronger hypothesis of uniform continuity (more precisely, uniform convergence). If one wishes to substantiate such a claim, then one must interpret Cauchy's use of the term "always" as meaning that Cauchy requires convergence not merely at the ªxed numbers (A-continuum), but also at the variable quantities (B-continuum), such as inªnitesimals.
But if one wishes to apply the Boyer inªnitesimal-to-limit translation, with an attendant interpretation of the point a as a real number, then one's conceptual framework excludes the possibility of evaluation at a variable quantity. If one excludes variable quantities by adhering to the inªnitesimal-to-limit translation, then one is unable to interpret Cauchy's extended hypothesis in 1853. If one wishes to understand Cauchy's extension of the hypothesis, one has to jettison the automatic translation-tolimits. What is caught in this tightening noose is a body of ºawed Cauchy scholarship going back to Boyer or earlier.
How does the traditional approach connect Cauchy's term always, to uniform convergence? J. Lützen notes that
The key word that separates [the 1853] statement from [Cauchy's] previous [1821] statement is "always" but only in the proof it becomes clear what it covers. (2003, p. 184) Lützen proceeds to reproduce a paragraph from Cauchy's proof, and notes that Cauchy's term "'always' covers the concept 'uniform Cauchy sequence in an interval' from which Cauchy immediately concluded 'uniform convergence in an interval.'" Lützen concludes as follows:
Cauchy carefully showed that a Fourier series similar to Abel's (Cauchy did not mention Abel) does not "always" converge in this sense, which explains why its sum is discontinuous. (p. 184) Now Cauchy did not use the terminology of either "uniform Cauchy sequence," or "uniform convergence." Lützen does not explain how it was exactly that Cauchy "carefully showed." Similarly, Lützen does not reproduce Cauchy's example x ϭ 1 n which would have shed light on the matter, by revealing a link to a B-continuum.
Conclusion
An examination of Cauchy's work on the sum theorem reveals that a coherent explanation thereof requires inªnitisimals to be part and parcel of Cauchy's continuum, as they were of Leibniz's, Bernoulli's, and Carnot's. The historical and philosophical signiªcance of our analysis is the revelation that modern reception of Cauchy's foundational work has been colored by a nominalistic attitude resulting in an ostrich effect when it comes to appreciating Cauchy's inªnitesimals, an attitude all the more puzzling since it must countenance an internal contradiction as analyzed in this article. See Katz and Katz (2011) for a detailed examination of a nominalism inherited from the great triumvirate. 11
Appendix A. Spalts Kontinuum
In a text entitled "Cauchys Kontinuum" (2002), D. Spalt seeks to provide a novel interpretation of Cauchy's foundational approach. Spalt afªrms the correctness of Cauchy's sum theorem of 1821, and at the same time denies that Cauchy ever used inªnitesimals.
The starting point of Spalt's (2002) interpretation is Cauchy's double parenthesis notation. Cauchy used such notation to signal situations where a multiple-valuedness arises. Spalt's interpretation rests on the mathematical fact that if a function (a) has a closed graph and (b) is single-valued, then it is continuous. Was it Cauchy's intention to deªne continuous functions in terms of such a property? If so, Cauchy would have called them single-valued functions. Cauchy's continuity has its source in naive perceptual continuity. Sensory perception experiences continuity in terms of slight dynamic change, when an inªnitesimal increment results in an inªnitesimal change of the dependent variable. Having deªned continuity in terms of such a rule of transforming inªnitesimals into inªnitesimals both in his Cours d'Analyse of 1821 and in his lectures of 1823, Cauchy again emphasizes this point in his letter to Coriolis in 1837: y varies imperceptibly with x.
Whenever Cauchy used the double parenthesis notation, it is always with reference to a single function f, such as 1 x , or square root of x, or arccos x, or sin 1
x . Meanwhile, Spalt is mainly interested in applying sequences of functions to sequences of points, as we discuss below.
The traditional interpretation as exempliªed by Boyer seeks to subsume Cauchy's inªnitesimals in what Boyer sees as an inchoate proto-Weierstrassian limit of f at, say, x ϭ 0. Spalt, meanwhile, seeks to subsume Cauchy's inªnitesimals in the calculation of the (potentially) multiple values of f at x ϭ 0.
However, Spalt's real interest is in applying the closed-graph interpretation to Cauchy's sum theorem. Here it is a sequence of partial sums that is being evaluated at a null sequence, so as to test the behavior of the limit at, say, x ϭ 0. There is no textual support in Cauchy for applying the double-parenthesis notation to a sequence. Whenever double parentheses are used in Cauchy, it is always with reference to a single function.
While Spalt is making a mathematically valid point that both continuity and the sum theorem admit a "closed graph" interpretation in terms of sequences, the attribution of such an interpretation to Cauchy is not supported by textual evidence.
The following exchange, represented by individuals A and B, took place in the fall of 2010 and illustrates well the issues involved in evaluating Cauchy's inªnitesimals.
A. Concerning "index": You claim that Cauchy "suppresses the index" in connection with his inªnitely small quantities. Where do you know this from? You can only suppress something you have-but Cauchy did not have indices in connection with his inªnitely small quantities. So you insinuate these indices, but they are not Cauchyan.
B. On page 192 of the ªrst volume of the Math. Intelligencer, Guggenheimer (1978 Guggenheimer ( /1979 ) equips Cauchy's inªnitesimals a lower index "n" by writing ␤ ϭ {␤ n }, and acts as if Cauchy did the same on page 26 of the Cours d'Analyse. In a subsequent issue, Gordon Fisher (1979 /1980 takes issue with this, and states that "It is Guggenheimer who introduces the sequence {␤ n } into the deªnition." Meanwhile, Cauchy does use lower indices for sequences (though not for inªnitesimals) in his proof of the intermediate value theorem (1821, Note III, pp. 460-462).
A. Every mathematician from at least about 1750 till about 1872 thought of the points of the continuum as forming a series-but none of them introduced this series as an indexed one. Not Cauchy either-whatever historians (like Guggenheimer) do say. Cauchy's indices (e.g. in ⌺ i i u x ( )) are variables with the natural numbers as values. But as far as I know Cauchy never claimed the points of the continuum to be capable of being indexed by the natural numbers. This does not prove that Cauchy doubted this possibility-but surely he did not see any possibility of how to do this.
B. Guggenheimer was certainly wrong as Fisher pointed out. Cauchy's variable quantities are sometimes discrete (as in 1821, when he gives an example 1, 1/2, 1/3, etc.) and sometimes continuous (as in 1823). As far as the continuum is concerned, Cauchy certainly never claimed to index the points of the continuum. But Cauchy himself gives an example of a discrete variable quantity in 1821, while in 1823 he worked with continuous variable quantities. The fact that he never labels its terms by a lower index conªrms my sentiment that he wants to underemphasize the role of this index and emphasize on the contrary other indices, such as the order of the inªnitesimal. The use of the term "suppress" in this sense is legitimate whether or not the index was there in the ªrst place.
A. Every renowned German mathematician of the middle of the 19th century deªned continuity initially as: inªnitely small changes of the variable produce inªnitely small changes of the function. Only in the sequel did they give an epsilon-delta-formulation. This coverage includes even Weierstrass! So there seems to be no justiªcation at all for later historians to claim the existence of a conceptual difference between an A-continuum and B-continuum in the middle of the 19th century. Of course this judgment has to include Cauchy as long as there is no proof of the contrary.
B. The proof to the contrary is Cauchy's 1853 text from the middle of the 19th century. There are numerous other proofs, as well. They include Cauchy's inªnitesimal deªnitions of "Dirac" delta functions in 1827 (Cauchy 1827) . On the other hand, what there is no proof to at all is the idea of a "closed graph" interpretation of Cauchy's sum theorem à la Spalt. It is true that a function is continuous if and only if its graph is closed. However, this has nothing to do with the function being or not being the sum of an inªnite series. Therefore this has nothing to do with Cauchy's sum theorem.
A. Could you specify where exactly such a "proof" is to be found? Which are the relevant sentences?
B. The addition of the term "always" to the hypothesis of the sum theorem in 1853 is interpreted by all traditional historians as adding the condition of uniform continuity. The meaning of the term only becomes clear in the proof when Cauchy tests the condition at the point x ϭ 1/n, show-ing that Abel's counterexample does not satisfy the hypothesis. One obtains uniform convergence by requiring the remainder term to tend to zero at the points of the B-continuum in addition to those of the A-continuum. Cauchy tests the condition at x ϭ 1/n. This sequence generates an inªnitesimal, i.e. a point of a B-continuum. Lützen (2003) fails to explain this, but Bråting does. The reference for the Dirac delta function is in Cauchy's 1827 texts cited in Laugwitz (1989) . Cauchy's theory of arbitrary real orders of inªnitesimals is in Cauchy ([1829] 1899) , and it anticipates work on orders of growth of functions by Stolz and du Bois-Reymond. The latter in turn inºuenced Skolem's construction of nonstandard models of arithmetic. Robinson wrote: "It seems likely that Skolem's idea to represent inªnitely large natural numbers by numbertheoretic functions which tend to inªnity (Skolem [1934] ), also is related to the earlier ideas of Cauchy and du Bois-Reymond" (1966, p. 278) .
A. Unfortunately I can't accept your "proof." You point to an example and you give interpretations, but you don't have a single deªnition (of Cauchy) at hand to strengthen your position. You claim that 1/n is an inªnitesimal (and you mean: a point of your B-continuum). Cauchy himself does not call 1/n an inªnitesimal; even though he could have done, as he deªnes an inªnitesimal to be a variable converging to zero (which 1/n certainly is), and so Cauchy can rely on the then common A-continuum.
B. The term "always" indicates a strengthening of the hypothesis. The hypothesis is strengthened by requiring the convergence condition at additional members of Cauchy's continuum. One such additional member is generated by 1/n. Cauchy proceeds to use it as an input to his functions. This is very similar to the variable quantity Cauchy gives as an example in 1821 (p. 27), namely the sequence 1 4 1 3 1 6 1 5 1 8 1 7 , , , , , . . .
These facts indicate that Cauchy was working with an extended continuum.
A. You ground your whole thesis merely on Cauchy's term "always"? You are really willing to claim Cauchy to have constructed a "B-continuum" (an outstanding mathematical construction none of Cauchy's contemporaries ever thought of) on this single word "always"? B. The B-continuum, as the name suggests, is rooted in the work of Bernoulli. Until the nominalistic reconstruction effected by Weierstrass and his followers starting in 1870, most mathematicians worked with inªnitesimals and naturally envisioned an inªnitesimal-enriched continuum, where entities in addition to Stevin (real) numbers 12 can be used as input to functions. Cauchy explained the use of the word "always" in his proof. Most historians in fact explain the addition of the word "always" as the addition of uniform continuity. This is only possible to do via a B-continuum.
A. Your interpretation is time-dependent: Earlier than 1958 you would and could not have given it! But we are talking about sources from the 19th century-and you need an interpretation which was possible already in the 19th century, not only a century later.
B. You are apparently referring to the year of publication of the work by Schmieden and Laugwitz (1958) on nonstandard extensions. But the idea that an inªnitesimal is represented by a null sequence is an ancient idea, and one that is even incorporated in the name itself. The word "inªnitesimal" is a 17th century Latin formation meaning "inªnitieth term" in a progression. Interpreting variable quantities as sequences is a widely accepted way of interpreting Cauchy. Variable quantities viewed as inªnitesimals are already in l'Hopital. The idea that when Carnot talks about variable quantities, he really means "inªnitesimals," seems to be widely accepted by historians. When Cauchy gives the same deªnition, should we assume that he means something else? The interpretation you referred to was already possible in the 17th century. The novelty of the 19th century was the nominalistic transformation effected by Weierstrass that prohibited talk about inªnitesimals on pain of being declared guilty of metaphysics. But the ideology of the "great triumvirate" 13 is being challenged by an increasingly vocal group of scholars, who are in particular not satisªed that when Cauchy talks about "inªnitesimals", one must assume that he really means something else.
A. Your B-continuum only exists (different from A-continuum) if inªnitesimals are numbers, not variables. And inªnitesimal numbers did not exist (as mathematical concepts-not as a chimera) before the 20th century. B. A close reading of Leibniz suggests, on the contrary, that inªnitesimals viewed as individuals/atomic entities are present in European mathematical thinking as early as the 17th century. As far as the 19th century is concerned, Ehrlich (2006) documents in detail the development of non-Archimedean systems in Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, and others. The distinction between number and variable that you insist upon is an artiªcial one. The point is that Cauchy uses inªnitesimals as inputs to his functions, and operates with them as if they were individuals/atomic entities. In this sense they are members of his continuum, though perhaps not of Spalts Kontinuum. This section analyzes the historical seeds of Robinson's theory, in the work of Fermat, Wallis, as well as Barrow. 15 The key concept here is that of adequality (see below). It should be kept in mind that Fermat never considered the local slope of a curve. Therefore one has to be careful not to attribute to Fermat mathematical content that could not be there. On the other hand, Barrow did study curves and their slope. Furthermore, Barrow exploited Fermat's adequality in his work (Barrow 1860, p. 252) , as documented by H. Breger (1994, p. 198) .
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14. In the context of the hyperreal extension of the real numbers, the map "st" sends each ªnite point x to the real point st(x) ∈ R inªnitely close to x. In other words, the map "st" collapses the cluster (halo) of points inªnitely close to a real number x, back to x.
15. While Barrow's role is also critical, we will mostly concentrate on Fermat and Wallis. The binary relation of "equality up to an inªnitesimal" was anticipated in the work of Pierre de Fermat. Fermat used a term usually translated into English as "adequality." 16 André Weil writes as follows:
Fermat [. . .] developed a method which slowly but surely brought him very close to modern inªnitesimal concepts. What he did was to write congruences between functions of x modulo suitable powers of x Ϫ x 0 ; for such congruences, he introduces the technical term adaequalitas, adaequare, etc., which he says he has borrowed from Diophantus. As Diophantus V.11 shows, it means an approximate equality, and this is indeed how Fermat explains the word in one of his later writings ( , p. 1146 ( ) Weil (p. 1146 ) then supplies the following quote from Fermat:
Adaequetur, ut ait Diophantus, 17 aut fere aequetur; in Mr. Mahoney's translation: "adequal, or almost equal" (p. 246) .
Here Weil is citing Mahoney (1973, p. 246; cf. Mahoney 1994, p. 247) . Mahoney similarly mentions the meaning of "approximate equality" or "equality in the limiting case" (1973, p. 164 , end of footnote 46). Mahoney also points out that the term "adequality" in Fermat has additional meanings. The latter are emphasized in a recent text by E. Giusti (1984) , who is sharply critical of Breger (1994) . While the review by Weil (1973) is similarly sharply critical of Mahoney, both agree that the meaning of "approximate equality," leading into inªnitesimal calculus, is at least one of the meanings of the term adequality for Fermat. 18 This meaning was aptly summarized by J. Stillwell. Stillwell's historical presentation is somewhat simpliªed, and does not sufªciently distinguish between the seeds actually present in Fermat, on the one hand, and a modern interpretation thereof, on the other, 19 but he does a splendid job of explaining the mathematical background for the uninitiated. Thus, he notes that 2x ϩ dx is not equal to 2x (see Figure 2 ), and writes:
Instead, the two are connected by a looser notion than equality that Fermat called adequality. If we denote adequality by = ad , then it is 16. In French one uses adégalité, adégal, see (Jensen 1969, p. 73 ). 17. The original term in Diophantus is ␣óª, see Weil (1984, p. 28) . 18. Jensen similarly describes adequality as approximate equality, and describes neglected terms as inªnitesimals in (1969, p. 82 ). Struik notes that "Fermat uses the term to denote what we call a limiting process" (1969, p. 220, footnote 5). K. Barner (2011) compiled a useful bibliography on Fermat's adequality, including many authors we have not mentioned here.
19. See main text around footnote 15 above for a mention of Barrow's role, documented by H. Breger. accurate to say that 2x ϩ dx = ad 2x; and hence that dy/dx for the parabola is adequal to 2x. Meanwhile, 2x ϩ dx is not a number, so 2x is the only number to which dy/dx is adequal. This is the true sense in which dy/dx represents the slope of the curve. (2006, p. 91)
Stillwell points out that
Fermat introduced the idea of adequality in 1630s but he was ahead of his time. His successors were unwilling to give up the convenience of ordinary equations, preferring to use equality loosely rather than to use adequality accurately. The idea of adequality was revived only in the twentieth century, in the so-called non-standard analysis. (2006, p. 91) We will refer to the map from the (ªnite part of the) B-continuum to the A-continuum as the Fermat-Robinson standard part, see Figure 3 .
As far as the logical criticism formulated by Rev. George is concerned, Fermat's adequality had pre-emptively provided the seeds of an answer, a century before the bishop ever lifted up his pen to write The Analyst (Berkeley 1734 ).
Fermat's contemporary John Wallis, in a departure from Cavalieri's focus on the geometry of indivisibles, emphasized the arithmetic of inªnitesimals (see J. Stedall's introduction in Wallis 2004) . To Cavalieri, a plane ªgure is made up of lines; to Wallis, it is made of parallelograms of Figure 4 ; copied from Muntersbjorn 2003, p. 170) .
He then computes the combined length of the bases of the parallelograms to be B 2 × ∞, and ªnds the area to be A B
Wallis used an actual inªnitesimal 1 ∞ in calculations as if it were an ordinary number, anticipating Leibniz's law of continuity.
Wallis's area calculation (B.1) is reproduced by J. Scott, who notes that Wallis treats inªnity as though the ordinary rules of arithmetic could be applied to it. (1981, p. 20) Such a treatment of inªnity strikes Scott as something of a blemish, as he writes:
But this is perhaps understandable. For many years to come the greatest confusion regarding these terms persisted, and even in the next century they continued to be used in what appears to us an amazingly reckless fashion. (p. 21) where r ∞ consists of unlimited hyperreals (i.e., inverses of nonzero inªnitesimals). The map "st" sends each ªnite point x ∈ r, to the real point st(x) ∈ R inªnitely close to x, as follows 20 :
Robinson's answer to Berkeley's logical criticism (see D. Sherry [1987] ) is to deªne the derivative as
instead of the inªnitesimal ratio ( ) ⌬ ⌬ y x itself. Note that both the term "hyper-real ªeld", and an ultrapower construction thereof, are due to E. Hewitt (1948, p. 74) . In 1966, Robinson referred to the theory of hyperreal ªelds (Hewitt [1948] ) which [. . .] can serve as non-standard models of analysis. (Robinson 1966, p. 278) The transfer principle is a precise implementation of Leibniz's heuristic law of continuity: "what succeeds for the ªnite numbers succeeds also for the inªnite numbers and vice versa," (see Robinson 1966, p. 266) . The transfer principle, allowing an extention of every ªrst-order real statement to the hyperreals, is a consequence of the theorem of J. Lon in 1955, and can therefore be referred to as a Leibniz-Lon transfer principle. A Hewitt-Lon framework allows one to work in a B-continuum satisfying the transfer principle. To elaborate on the ultrapower construction of the hyperreals, let Q N denote the ring of sequences of rational numbers. Let represents a nonzero inªnitesimal, whose sign depends on whether or not the set 2N of even integers is a member of the ultraªlter. To obtain a full hyperreal ªeld, we replace Q by R in the construction, and form a similar quotient
We wish to emphasize the analogy with formula (C.2) above which served to deªne the A-continuum. A more detailed discussion of the ultrapower construction can be found 21. In this construction, every null sequence deªnes an inªnitesimal, but the converse is not necessarily true. Modulo suitable foundational material, one can ensure that every inªnitesimal is represented by a null sequence; an appropriate ultraªlter (called a P-point) will exist if one assumes the continuum hypothesis, or even the weaker Martin's axiom. See Cutland et al (1988) for details. Figure 5 . An intermediate ªeld Q / F u is built directly out of Q in the book by M. Davis ([1977 Davis ([ ] 2005 . See also P. Blaszczyk (2009) for some philosophical implications. More advanced properties of the hyperreals such as saturation were proved later (see H. J. Keisler 1994 for a historical outline). A helpful "semicolon" notation for presenting an extended decimal expansion of a hyperreal was described by A. H. Lightstone (1972) . See also P. Roquette (2010) for inªnitesimal reminiscences.
